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ABSTRACT 
The present paper aims to show that the phenomenological method is a crucial methodological 
element of all research that is based on the interpretation of utterances or texts based on expe-
riences, such as religious studies. Following the neophenomenological school, the notion of 
“phenomenon” is understood in a radically relative way: “A phenomenon for a person at a given 
point of time is a state of affairs for which this person cannot — in spite of trying to vary the 
presuppositions she makes as much as possible — withdraw the belief that it is a fact” (Schmitz, 
2003: 1). Starting from this notion, phenomenology may fruitfully criticise two common 
strategies: reduction and construction. The first one tries to reduce experiences to allegedly 
more fundamental processes like electrical impulses in neural nets. Here the phenomenologist 
must object that in doing so without preceding phenomenological analysis the reductionist 
will lose large parts of potentially important information. As for the second strategy, construc-
tions — in the sense of presuppositions, ready-made concepts, etc. — are present in all texts 
that are meant to express an experience. In order to describe the underlying experience more 
adequately, phenomenological researchers have to remove as many constructions as possible. 
In this way they not only produce a description that is “closer” to the experience (though they 
can never hope to fully grasp it), but they also pave the way for comparison and dialogue across 
religions and cultures.
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INTRODUCTION
The present paper1 has a quite modest aim: It does not attempt to assign any new 
role to phenomenology, but rather to clarify its relation to popular methods in 
science and philosophy. The arguments used are for the most part not new, but 
in a time where scientific research is more and more based on big data analysis 
as opposed to small-scale studies it may be appropriate to emphasise that phe-
nomenology still has a specific and crucial role to play.
As the very notion of “phenomenology” may give rise to certain misunder-
standings let me try to clarify one or two points at the very beginning. First of 
all, it should be noted that what is at stake here is not phenomenology as such, 
but its role in the methodological “ecosystem”, especially its critical function. 
Secondly, and most importantly, I would like to underscore that I use the term 
“phenomenology” as designation of an open philosophical a p p r o a c h  or g e n -
e r a l  m e t h o d to be described in more detail later. In other words, I do not 
regard phenomenology as a fixed and closed doctrine or system; in particular, 
I do not use the term as a quasi-synonym for Husserlian philosophy. To be sure, 
Husserl was one of the pioneers of a phenomenological method and used in an 
admirable way. Nevertheless, his way of doing things is by no means the only one, 
so it should not be equated with phenomenology in general.2
After these introductory and cautionary remarks it is time to sketch how 
I use the term “phenomenological method” on these pages. I do not claim that 
all colleagues seeing themselves as phenomenologists will agree with all parts of 
the following sketch, but at least I will try to stick to Husserl’s famous motto: 
“Zu den Sachen selbst!”. These words imply that in the general philosophical 
discourse we are not talking about “the real things”, which, therefore, should 
necessarily be identified in the first place. This program may look like a truism, 
because every science should define the “things” it deals with, but phenomenol-
ogy has special requirements towards its objects: they should be real, funda-
mental and solid, or at least more real, fundamental and solid than the objects 
of non-phenomenological philosophers. Different phenomenological schools 
define the notion of phenomenon in different ways. The definition I will use 
in this paper is the one by Hermann Schmitz,3 the founder of the so-called ne-
1 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their very valuable and perceptive 
critical comments. 
2 A critical assessment of both Husserl and Heidegger from a radical phenomenological 
standpoint can be found in Schmitz, 1999. 
3 Schmitz (born 1928) is a very prolific philosopher; a bibliography of his writings, includ-
ing references to some English and Polish translations, can be found under: gnp-online.de/
Bibliographie.18.0.html. He is perhaps best known for his emphasis on the fundamental im-
portance of the felt body (Leib), though it would be wrong to reduce him to this aspect of his 
philosophy. His theories of subjectivity, manifoldness, and time — to name but a few central 
topics — are, in my estimation, of at least the same philosophical interest.
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ophenomenological school, because (in my opinion) it is particularly powerful 
as an instrument of critique:
A p h e n o m e n o n  for a person at a given point of time is a state of affairs for which this 
person cannot — in spite of trying to vary the presuppositions she makes as much as possi-
ble — withdraw the belief that it is a fact (Schmitz, 2003: 1).4 
It must be underscored at the outset that this notion is relative in a double 
sense: in respect to the person perceiving the phenomenon and in respect to 
time. In other words, what is a phenomenon for person S at time t1 must not be 
a phenomenon for person T at the same moment, or for the same person S at an-
other point of time t2. It follows from this definition that the position of the first 
person is in a certain sense privileged, but this fact does in no way imply that phe-
nomenology should be restricted to introspection. Rather, the phenomenologist 
should take into account as many sources and perspectives as possible, because 
in this way she increases her potential for the variation of presuppositions. It is 
a second important implication of this double-relative notion of phenomenon 
that all results achieved by this method must necessarily be preliminary and 
should be subjected to constant investigation. So there is no hope for a final 
truth here, and aspirations for a Husserlian Wesensschau and the like are out of 
the question. As far as the kinds of possible phenomena are concerned, the defi-
nition is completely general and makes no distinction between a simple affection 
of the felt body, like a short feeling of pain, and a rich emotional situation that 
is characterised not only by a certain state of the felt body, but also by a complex 
interplay of, say, desires, fears, the physical presence of a second person etc. On 
this very fundamental methodological level there is no fundamental difference 
between different types of phenomena, though appropriate methods of analysis 
must of course be adapted to each single case and can vary widely. 
PHENOMENOLOGY WITH A CRITICAL AIM
From a methodological point of view, phenomenology is most directly opposed 
to two intellectual strategies that shall be labelled reduction and construction. 
I will take them up in turn in order to show the specific ways in which the phe-
nomenological method runs counter to their approach.
4 Translation by S.S.; in German: “Ein Phänomen für jemand zu einer Zeit ist ein Sachver-
halt, dem der Betreffende dann trotz tunlichster Variation seiner Annahmen nicht im Ernst 
den Glauben entziehen kann, dass es sich um eine Tatsache handelt.”
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P h e n o m e n o l o g y  a n d  r e d u c t i o n
Passing by all the finer points, reductionist approaches may be quite neatly cir-
cumscribed as such that tend to use formulations like “A is nothing but B”, or 
“A is ultimately B”. Reductionists can come from very different quarters, as the 
following examples show:
(1) “The feeling of a divine presence is nothing but a particular activity of the frontal 
lobe”.
(2) “Ultimately, religion is merely a traditional instrument to reduce complexity”.
It should be quite evident in which respect the reductionist approach is, so to 
speak, counterphenomenological. While the phenomenologist — once he has 
identified a phenomenon, e.g., an experience of divine presence — is interested 
in its content, the reductionist tries to eliminate the phenomenon together with 
its context by connecting it with some other, “more fundamental”, fact. 
In order to understand the mutual relationship of these approaches and to 
assess their respective value, it is useful to distinguish between ontological and 
practical reductionism. The former aims at undermining the ontological status 
of, say, an experience of divine presence to a mere epiphenomenon, illusion or 
the like; the latter does not make ontological claims, but uses the reductionist 
approach to achieve a practical aim. As it would lead too far to try to raise ques-
tions of fundamental ontology here, and also because from a methodological 
point of view ontological reductionism seems less relevant, I will restrict myself 
to discussing the practical variation, but the critique adduced in the following 
also applies, mutatis mutandis, to the ontological branch.
To illustrate practical reductionism let us consider a fictitious example: 
A scholar studies the religion of an ethnic group solely in a statistical way — i.e., 
basing his research on simple questionnaires, without talking to the believers 
— because he wants to make predictions about its future in the context of a po-
tential religious war. Research of this kind is certainly legitimate, and no direct 
problem with phenomenology arises. Nevertheless, in real-world circumstances 
with limited research funds, colleagues with a practical agenda sometimes dis-
card phenomenological and other non-goal-oriented approaches as a futile waste 
of money and resources. Only by reducing complex subjective phenomena to less 
complex and objectively describable factors, it is argued, one may gain practically 
significant results. How can a phenomenologist answer to such an allegation? 
I see two ways, but neither of them is completely satisfactory. 
Firstly, it is easy to show that even the most radical reductionist needs some-
thing to reduce. Even if the reduction is done in a very primitive way, e.g. when 
the belief of person is reduced to the answer “YES” in a questionnaire asking 
“Do you believe in God?”, the statistician must presuppose a not yet reduced 
phenomenon of belief. Perhaps here one might argue that such phenomena form 
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part of everyday knowledge and experience, hence do not require any sophis-
ticated analysis and can be reduced right away. In many other cases, however, 
it is rather obvious that a detailed phenomenological analysis is indispensable 
to provide much valuable material for reductionist researchers. For instance, 
a neurophysiologist will only be able to look fruitfully for correlations between 
experiences and neuronal patterns if his “roadmap” is a good phenomenological 
description of those experiences. So the phenomenologist may prove to be use-
ful, even necessary, but it is the usefulness of a subordinate figure.
The second strategy of self-defence would avoid this outcome: It emphasizes 
the intrinsic value of a phenomenological analysis and the impoverished picture 
of the world that emerges from reductionist approaches. One might also say that 
for a reductionist it may be possible to e x p l a i n certain aspects of a phenom-
enon, let’s say a religious experience — e.g., under which circumstances it arises, 
which neuronal patterns appear along with it, etc. — but in such way it will be 
impossible to u n d e r s t a n d this experience from inside, as it were.5 This argu-
ment may be convincing for sympathetic persons, but a radical reductionist who 
takes religion to be nothing but mumbo-jumbo might argue that for him it is 
enough to find the brain areas responsible for religious experiences, he does not 
need to know exactly h o w  i t  i s  l i k e to be a religious person.6 
To sum up: phenomenology will not be able to demonstrate its intrinsic value 
to a practically minded person, but it may:
(1) firstly, show its indispensability for reductionist approaches — though this only gives 
it the humble position of a deliverer of useful material;
(2) secondly, remind us constantly of the fact that the world is much richer than reductio-
nist analyses tend to make us think.
So it seems, after all, as if the phenomenological and the reductionist ap-
proach may quite happily, and even fruitfully, coexist, as long as both sides show 
the required respect and understanding. With the other counterpart, construc-
tion, it is a different story.
P h e n o m e n o l o g y  a n d  c o n s t r u c t i o n
One may safely say that the analysis and description of human experiences is one 
of the main tasks of phenomenology. This means that, if the phenomenological 
researcher does not confine herself to introspection, she inevitably has to deal 
5 Such arguments go back to Dilthey’s distinction between erklären and verstehen.
6 This formulation alludes to Thomas Nagel’s well-known paper What  is it like to be a bat?, 
which however has a slightly different topic. Generally speaking, one can say that Nagel be-
longs to the analytically oriented philosophers with the greatest openness for a phenomeno-
logical perspective.
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with oral, written, or other kinds of texts of other persons. And it should be 
quite clear that no text can be accepted right away as a phenomenologically ad-
equate description of the underlying experience (to use a somehow simplifying 
formulation, on which see the remarks below). Rather, even a seemingly simple 
utterance like: 
I can feel the presence of God right now.
contains a great many implicit presuppositions, theories, structures etc. that I re-
fer to with the general term “constructions” here. We therefore have to question 
and analyse as many of these constructing elements as possible — beginning with 
such loaded and difficult concepts as “presence” and “God” — and remove those 
that are not in accord with the structure of the experience the text is meant to 
describe.7 In this sense, phenomenology is a kind of deconstruction.
Such a removing of superstructures can prove extremely fruitful, one im-
portant result being that it makes possible intercultural comparisons and inter-
religious dialogue by pointing to common experiences, rather than dwelling on 
linguistic and doctrinal differences. At the same time, it is a massive and difficult 
task that is fraught with all kinds of practical and methodological problems, 
which cannot be tackled in the frame of this modest piece. In any case, in accord-
ance with the notion of phenomenon I presented at the beginning of this paper, 
there should be no hope to ever reach something like an “ultimate” or “pure” 
experience. An experience, conceived as the basis of a complex phenomenon, 
remains a kind of “regulative idea”8 that has the power to guide our research, but 
can never be fully captured by any kind of description or analysis.9
So it may seem that the relationship between phenomenology and construc-
tion is an antagonistic one; but perhaps it would be better to call it dialectical. 
If we understand phenomenology as a continuous work of deconstruction, it is 
obvious that it needs constructions to thrive upon, so to speak. On the other 
hand, in order not to be completely empty, theoretical constructions need some 
sort of experiential basis. To be sure, the experience itself is not provided by phe-
nomenology, but a person with a knowledge of good phenomenological descrip-
tions concerning his field of experience may very well develop a higher sensitivity 
for certain aspects, or may even discover certain things for the first time, just as 
a good analysis of a piece of music allows us to discern features we did not notice 
before though we have listened to the piece a hundred times. In this sense it can 
7 Many examples of this approach can be found in Schmitz, 1977. 
8 I am using Kant’s term that he introduced in the Appendix to the Transcendental dialectic 
in a slightly free way here (cf. Kant, 1983: B 670–697 / A 642–669).
9 The whole complex of problems connected with the fact that a description uses lan-
guage whereas an experience is proto-linguistic can only be mentioned here.
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be said that phenomenological research paves the way for a richer experience 
and, consequently, for more interesting and richer constructions.
Moreover, it should be noted that phenomenological research not only fights 
for strengthening the link between our experiences and our talking about these 
experiences, but keeps alive the knowledge about the fundamental role of our 
experience in respect to all kinds of theories and constructions.
CONCLUSIONS
I hope it has become plausible that the critical potential of the phenomenologi-
cal approach gives it a crucial role in the methodological ecosystem. The follow-
ing schema is meant to illustrate the above argumentation, and the explanatory 
remarks accompanying it may, at the same time, serve as a kind of summary.
Fig. 1: Experience between, phenomenological analysis, reduction and construction.
E x p l a n a t i o n: The two Xs symbolise two different experiences, their fuzzy 
shapes indicating the chaotic indistinctness characteristic of an experience in its 
initial stage. The arrows leading from an X to one of the “bubbles” stand for the 
process of articulation that results in an utterance, which may be made in any 
language (here symbolised by different alphabets) the experiencer happens to 
know well enough. As researchers dealing with, e.g., religious phenomena, we 
frequently have to start with utterances: oral and written texts of believers etc., 
and as phenomenologists we try to remove as many elements of constructions 
from these texts, in order to approach the phenomenon behind a given utter-
ance as closely as possible — this movement is expressed by the arrows pointing 
towards the central X. They all end in a circle that symbolises the result of the 
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phenomenological analysis; the distance between circle and X indicates that 
there always remains a fundamental difference between any phenomenologi-
cal description and the phenomenon it is meant to describe. Please also note 
the small arrow pointing from “ABC” to ABC! that is meant to indicate a very 
common, but unphenomenological usage of religious utterances, namely their 
transformation into a dogma. The arrow that points from “ABD” to the circle 
shows a possible error by which a researcher connects an utterance to the wrong 
kind of experience. Lastly it must be explained how reduction is included in 
our schema. Here, we see a bending arrow leading from the utterance “ABC” to 
a triangle that symbolises the process of reduction leading to a result represented 
by a graph. Please note that the arrow bypasses the circle, i.e. the reductionist 
typically applies her method directly to a more or less intuitive understanding of 
the utterances it uses as raw material and does not care about phenomenological 
analyses — though this can and should be done, as was argued above. 
Summing up, phenomenology (in the restricted sense explained above) 
should be regarded as a crucial part of the methodological toolkit because it is 
indispensable to achieve the following tasks:
(1) preparing material for reductionist research;
(2) “earthing” constructions by removing superstructures,
(3) thus also enabling comparison and dialogue.
In this paper the positive achievements of phenomenology have deliberately 
been left out of the picture in order to focus on its methodological function. 
Thus it will be in order to add as a final note that, in my opinion, the most 
genuine function of phenomenology consists in showing the richness of real-life 
experiences and making them accessible for discussion and reflection by teaching 
how to talk about them.
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